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Plurality Voting: the statistical laws of democracy in Brazil
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We explore the statistical laws behind the plurality voting system by investigating the election
results for mayor held in Brazil in 2004. Our analysis indicate that the vote partition among
mayor candidates of the same city tends to be “polarized” between two candidates, a phenomenon
that can be closely described by means of a simple fragmentation model. Complex concepts like
“government continuity” and “useful vote” can be identified and even statistically quantified through
our approach.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a
Understanding the process by which the individuals
of a society make up their minds and reach opinions
about different issues can be of great importance. In
this context, the election is a fundamental democratic
process and the vote certainly represents the most effec-
tive instrument for regular citizens to promote significant
changes in their communities.
General elections in Brazil are held every four years,
when citizens vote for executive as well as legislative man-
dates. Voting is compulsory and ballots are collected in
electronic voting machines. In the case of the legisla-
tive mandates, which include elections for congressmen,
state deputies and city counselors, a proportional voting
system is used, where candidates compete for a limited
number of seats and become elected in proportion to their
corresponding voting fraction. In two previous studies
[1, 2], the statistical analysis for the Brazilian 1998 and
2002 elections revealed that the proportional voting pro-
cess for federal and state deputies displays scale invari-
ance [3]. It has been shown that the distribution of the
number of candidates N receiving a fraction of votes v
follows a power-lawN(v) ∼ vα, where α ≈ −1, extending
over two orders of magnitude. The striking similarity in
the distribution of votes in all states, regardless of large
diversities in social and economical conditions in different
regions of the country, has been taken as an indication
of a common mechanism in the decision process. More
precisely, it has been suggested that the explanation for
this robust scale invariance is a multiplicative process in
which the voter’s choice for a candidate is governed by a
product, instead of a sum of probabilities [4].
For the selection to executive mandates (president,
state governors and mayors), one of the most common
election formats is the so called plurality voting system,
where the winning candidate is only required to receive
the largest number of votes in his/her favor, after which
all other runners automatically and completely lose. This
system is applied in 43 of the 191 countries in the United
Nations, Brazil being the largest democracy in this group.
Plurality voting has been studied extensively in politi-
cal science [5] and effects such as the approval of pre-
vious administrations or tactical voting, including the so
called “useful vote”, have been discussed from psycholog-
ical and sociological points of view. What is missing is a
careful statistical description and a mathematical model
that include these effects revealing common mechanisms
in the decision process.
Here we analyse for the first time the election statistics
for an executive mandate in Brazil. On 6 October 2004,
there was an election in Brazil’s 5,562 cities in which
102,817,864 electors chose one from among up to 14 can-
didates for mayor. The collection of ballots was entirely
electronic, thus permitting a very rapid count and publi-
cation of the results [6]. In Fig. 1 we show the distribution
of the fraction of votes v for the winner (right) and for
the loser (left), if only two candidates were in the race.
The superposition of both sides leads to a distribution
that displays a pronounced cusp at v = 0.5 and differs
strongly from a uniform distribution. As shown in Fig. 1
(solid lines), the entire data set can be well described by
an exponential decay of the form,
P (v) ∝ exp
(
−|v − 0.5|
λ
)
, (1)
with the parameter λ ≈ 0.08. The values for the left and
right sides correspond to the excess and deficit of votes
for the winning and losing candidates, respectively. The
sharpness of the curve beautifully illustrates the effect
of polarization which drives a typical ballot close to the
marginal situation of a tie.
In Fig. 2 we show the statistics of the winner for cities
with three and four candidates. As depicted, both dis-
tributions display a cusp-shaped maximum close to the
same value v = 0.5, and exponential tails on both sides.
This behavior can be described by a generalization of
the fragmentation model of Ref. [7], based on the well
known fact that the approval (or disapproval) of the
previous municipal administration usually decides rather
early whether the acting mayor or the candidate he/she
supports as follower is reelected or not. We start by divid-
ing the electorate into two fractions, v1 and r1 = 1− v1.
Keeping intact the fraction v1, we divide r1 into v2 and
r2 = r1 − v2. At a third step, while v2 remains undi-
vided, the fraction r2 is partitioned again, and so on. As
opposed to Ref. [7], where the limit of an infinite number
of fragments is investigated, here we consider a process
in which a finite number n of fragments (fraction of the
electorate) is generated with sizes that can be written
2as v1 = x1, v2 = (1 − x1)x2, v3 = (1 − x1)(1 − x2)x3,
..., vn−1 = (1 − x1)(1 − x2)...(1 − xn−1)xn, and vn =
(1−x1)(1−x2)...(1−xn−2)(1−xn−1), with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 be-
ing a random variable distributed according to the same
function ρ(x). This randomness excludes at this point
any tactical voting strategies. We simply attribute to
each candidate i a fraction of votes vi, with i = 1, 2, 3, ...,
n− 1, n.This is justifiable if we assume that vi should be
closely related with the fraction of electors “decided” to
vote in candidate i. In this way, it is reasonable to adopt
the distribution given by Eq. (1) (see also Fig. 1) as a
first approximation for ρ(x). Under this framework, one
can also think of x1 as being the fraction of the electorate
voting for “continuity”. Following this model, for exam-
ple, the fraction of votes vmax of the most voted among
a finite number n of competing candidates is given by,
vmax = max[v1, v2, v3, ..., vn−1, vn] . (2)
For the numerical solution of our model, we first generate
n− 1 random numbers distributed according to Eq. (1).
From these, we calculate the entire set of vi fractions
and determine the largest one, vmax, the second largest
one, v2max, the third largest one, v3max, and so on. We
repeat this process N = 105 times in order to produce
histograms for vmax, v2max and v3max, as displayed in
Figs. 2, 4a and 4b, respectively. As shown in Fig. 2, the
agreement between the real data and the model predic-
tions for vmax with n = 2 and 3 is very good, without
the need of any adjusting parameter of the fragmentation
model. This confirms the validity of our approach.
The selection of one among n candidates by the pop-
ulation during an electoral campaign is certainly not a
static process. For example, the dynamics of a typical
voting process that is studied here is shown in Fig. 3,
where we present the results of a sequence of polls made
before the mayor election in Sa˜o Paulo during the cam-
paign of 2004 [8]. First, the time evolution of these polls
illustrates well the “polarization” between the first and
the second most voted candidates. Second, the growth
in popularity of both candidacies is a clear consequence
of the loss of votes of the two less voted candidates. This
tactical transference of votes is explained as follows. Be-
ing driven by the results of election polls widely spread
in the media during the campaign, the electors tend to
adopt the so-called “useful vote”, either to try to guar-
antee or to prevent the victory in the first round of the
most voted candidate.
As shown in Fig. 4a, the fraction of votes for the sec-
ond most voted among three candidates (n = 3) clearly
reveals a tendency towards a peak that is also surpris-
ingly close to v = 0.5. Interestingly, this result only
agrees with the model prediction if we admit a shift to
the right, i.e. a systematic excess of votes for the second
candidate which is due to the “useful vote” effect. The
results shown in Fig. 4b confirm the hypothesis of a po-
larized election. Due to the “useful vote”, a significant
number of votes is transferred from the third to the other
candidates.
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FIG. 1: Histograms of voting fraction for mayor elections of
Brazilian cities in 2004. The data correspond to elections with
only two candidates and all ordinates have been divided by a
factor of 103. The circles give the frequency of fraction votes
for the winner, while the downward triangles are the results
for the loser. The solid lines are symmetric with respect to v =
0.5 and represent the best fits to the data by the exponential
function, P (v) ∝ exp(−|v − 0.5|/λ).
In summary, based on a Brazilian dataset for plural-
ity voting of unseen quality, we have discovered the ex-
istence of a strongly peaked exponential distribution in
the case of only two candidates, showing the effect of po-
larization. When more candidates are involved, a simple
fragmentation model based on early decisions concerning
continuity is able to explain the shape of the distribution
of the winner. Taking into account the polarization due
to the “useful vote”, we can justify a systematic shift in
the distribution of the losing candidates.
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FIG. 2: Histograms of the voting fraction for the most voted
candidates vmax in elections with three (circles) and four (up-
ward triangles) candidates. The solid lines are the predictions
of the fragmentation model.
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of the percentage of votes for the first
four most voted candidates participating in the election for
mayor in Sa˜o Paulo during the campaign of 2004. These polls
have been made by the Brazilian agency IBOPE [8]. The
time in days is counted from the date of the first poll, namely
28 of June of 2004. The gradual approximation between the
first two most voted candidates shows the polarization phe-
nomenon, while the growth of both candidacies illustrates the
“useful vote” effect. The solid lines are cubic splines drawn
to facilitate the view.
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FIG. 4: Statistics of the second and third voted candidates in
elections with only three candidates. In (a) we see that the
data for the second voted candidate significantly deviate from
the model predictions (solid line), revealing the effect of the
“useful vote”. The full line is obtained by shifting the model
results by about 0.1. The results for the third voted candidate
in (b) show an opposite deviation between data (circles) and
model predictions (solid line).
